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WHAT’S HAPPENING TO BRITAIN’S 
NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE?
RUDOLF KLEIN
From the London School of Economics and the London School of Hy-
giene and Tropical Medicine — both in London.
RITAIN’S National Health Service (NHS), as
constituted in 1948, had two defining charac-
teristics. First, it was a universal system, fund-
ed predominantly by taxation, that made health care
available to the whole population and removed fi-
nancial barriers to access. Second, it was essentially
a paternalistic system designed to meet the needs of
patients as defined by the professionals delivering the
services rather than to respond to the demands ar-
ticulated by patients. These have continued to be the
defining characteristics of the NHS over the decades.
Now, however, the government is proposing a trans-
formation of the system. The financial and organiza-
tional framework of the NHS is to remain intact,
but the dynamics will change. The NHS will cease to
be “a 1940s system operating in a 21st century world,”
as it was described last year in “The NHS Plan,” a re-
port setting out the government’s policies.1 Waiting
lists will no longer be the symbol of the NHS, and
the system will no longer be dominated by providers.
Instead, it will be a responsive, patient-centered system
guaranteeing quick access to care that meets a uni-
form standard of high quality throughout the country.
That, at any rate, is the vision. To achieve it, the
British government has pledged to increase funding
for the NHS over the next few years at an unprece-
dented rate. Even so, the plan to transform the sys-
tem remains a high-risk enterprise — the equivalent
of  reengineering  a  racing  car  while  it  is  whizzing
round the track — for the plan assumes nothing less
than a change in the culture of the NHS, with im-
portant implications for the medical profession, among
others. In this report, I discuss the specific policy in-
itiatives that are being introduced and analyze their
chances of success. In doing so, my focus is on the
NHS in England. Wales and Scotland have been giv-
en greater scope to decide their own policies, and
the health services in those countries are increasingly
diverging from the model in England.
RECENT HISTORY OF THE NHS
Since the NHS was instituted, successive govern-
ments have strived to reconcile two objectives: min-
B
imizing its budget while maximizing its productivi-
ty.2 The first objective reflects the fact that health
care has to compete with other services (such as ed-
ucation) for public resources and is further constrained
by the desire of all governments to win elections by
keeping taxes as low as possible. The second objective
reflects the fact that a combination of demographic
changes and technological advances has made it im-
perative to increase the NHS’s output of services if
public expectations are to be met.
The first objective has been achieved. The NHS
remains a model of fiscal restraint. It provides a uni-
versal service at a lower cost — as measured by the
proportion of the national income devoted to health
care — than that of health care systems in similar
countries. But maximizing productivity — the second
objective — has led to a continuous effort by succes-
sive governments to squeeze more services out of the
available resources. And, to an extent, the strategy has
succeeded. As measured by the number of patients
treated and the number of procedures carried out,
the NHS has an impressive record of improving ef-
ficiency year by year.
There was a price to be paid, however. Strength-
ening management, one of the strategies adopted, may
have helped increase efficiency. But it also created re-
sentment among health care professionals — in par-
ticular, doctors — who saw it as a threat to their sta-
tus and autonomy. And resentment led to protest.
By the end of the 1980s, the medical profession was
proclaiming (not for the first time) the impending
collapse of the NHS. Doctors became less and less
inclined to accept responsibility for having to ration
scarce resources by presenting decisions about whom
to treat and how as clinical decisions.3,4 The political
costs to the government of economic stringency be-
gan to rise. Ministers might spout statistics about the
number of patients treated and the number of oper-
ations carried out, but the public preferred to believe
the doctors and nurses who appeared on television
to grumble about inadequacies. Complaints about the
underfunding of the NHS — a constant theme al-
most since the start of the system — rose in pitch
and volume.
In 1991, in response to these problems, Margaret
Thatcher’s government introduced the so-called in-
ternal market. Previously, health authorities, funded
by the national government, had been responsible
for running hospitals and other services. Now they
became purchasers, buying health care from semi-
independent hospital trusts. At the same time, the
government introduced fundholding for general prac-
titioners. Previously, general practitioners had referred
patients to specialists and had had no incentive to
take into account the costs of specialty care. With the
new approach, general practitioners could opt to have
budgets for purchasing the specialty services their pa-
tients needed. The underlying assumption was that
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competition among providers and increased sensitiv-
ity to price among purchasers would lead to greater
efficiency.
For a variety of reasons, the internal market never
worked as intended,5,6 though there is some evidence
of improved efficiency. But it did have some unfore-
seen consequences. It reinforced resentment within
the medical profession, which had demonstrated its
impotence by campaigning strenuously but unsuc-
cessfully against the reforms. The internal market also
increased the visibility of the NHS’s activities (and
failings) by generating more information about the
service, an effect compounded by the increasing in-
terest of the media in the system. At the 1997 general
election, which brought Tony Blair’s Labour Party into
office, the NHS was one of the liabilities of the in-
cumbent Conservative Party.
THE NEW LABOUR PARTY
The Labour Party came into power pledging to
abolish the internal market. And in rhetoric it did so
within a few months. The 1997 report spelling out the
Labour government’s plans for the NHS7 announced
the abolition of the internal market. Cooperation was
to take the place of competition. But the separation
of functions between purchasers and providers re-
mained. Similarly, fundholding by general practition-
ers was abolished. However, it was replaced by primary
care groups, with delegated budgets. These groups
consisted of general practitioners in geographically
defined areas (average population, 100,000) who were
responsible for purchasing health care on behalf of
their patients. The primary care groups are evolving
into primary care trusts, with independent budgets,
and  by  2004  they  will  be  responsible  for  spending
some 75 percent of the NHS’s budget. In effect, fund-
holding has become universalized. General practition-
ers, in the words of the 1997 report, “will be in the
driving seat in shaping local health services in the
future.”
This could signal perhaps the most radical change
in the history of the NHS: a service driven from the
bottom up instead of from the top down, reflecting
local rather than national priorities. But it is far from
clear how much freedom the primary care trusts will
have in “shaping local health services,” since the 1997
report also announced a battery of measures designed
to strengthen the grip of the central government on
the service. These measures reflected the government’s
commitment  to  creating  a  service  that  offers  uni-
formly high standards of care throughout the country.
This had been the ambition of the NHS’s founders.
But in practice it had not been achieved: geographic
variations in the scope, efficiency, and quality of serv-
ices persisted. For example, rates of hip replacement
for persons over the age of 65 years ranged from 1.5
per 1000 population in Doncaster to more than 4 per
1000 in Devon. Similarly, some hospitals performed
almost 100 percent of cataract-removal operations as
day surgery, whereas others carried out less than 10
percent on an outpatient basis.
To achieve its aims, the government launched a
variety of new initiatives. It introduced a system of
clinical governance: every trust was required to estab-
lish a means of reviewing the quality of the services it
provided. The government also created a national in-
spectorate,  the  Commission  for  Health  Improve-
ment, to ensure that this system of quality control
was working effectively. The National Institute for
Clinical Excellence was established “to promote clin-
ical and cost-effectiveness by producing clinical guide-
lines and audits, for dissemination throughout the
NHS.” National Service Frameworks for cancer and
other major areas of care were introduced as blue-
prints for the design of local services. The government
established a host of new indicators in order to assess
the performance of individual providers.8 These in-
cluded indicators of efficiency (such as the cost per
unit of service), appropriateness (such as rates of di-
lation and curettage performed in women under the
age of 40 years and rates of surgery for otitis media),
and outcomes (such as preventable diseases and ad-
verse events).
It remains to be seen whether this emphasis on
quality will limit the autonomy of clinicians and, if
so, in what ways. Contrary to the view that “social-
ized medicine” means less freedom for doctors, cli-
nicians in the NHS have traditionally enjoyed much
greater immunity from scrutiny than have their coun-
terparts in the United States. Now, however, this is
changing. It is still uncertain, for example, whether
the guidelines of the National Institute for Clinical
Excellence on what drugs to prescribe and what pro-
cedures to perform will be mandatory or whether
they will change clinical practice. But it is clear that
the medical profession is under pressure to eradicate
poor practice. Following a series of scandals involv-
ing individual clinicians and under pressure from the
government, the General Medical Council (the body
responsible for licensing and disciplining doctors) is
reforming its procedures and constitution.9 It is also
introducing regular revalidation reviews for all doctors
—  that  is,  doctors  will  be  required  to  demonstrate
their continued competence to practice. In short, the
council is attempting to protect the collective auton-
omy of the profession by limiting the autonomy of
its individual members. And the government is in-
troducing  procedures  for  assessing  doctors  whose
performance is considered inadequate by their em-
ployers in the NHS.10
The effect of these initiatives on patients has been
less apparent. The one visible change was the intro-
duction of NHS Direct, a telephone advisory service
operated  by  nurses.  Overall,  the  immediate  effect
was to raise public expectations without satisfying
them, since the government had not provided the
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additional resources required to do so. Waiting lists
for surgery, tests and other procedures, and appoint-
ments continued to remain long, and a succession of
initiatives  designed  to  shorten  the  lists  were  only
marginally effective. Evidence of inadequacy contin-
ued to accumulate, particularly in the winter of 1999,
when an outbreak of influenza overloaded emergency
departments.
The government’s reaction was to intervene more
directly  and  frantically  in  the  affairs  of  the  NHS.
Managers and health care professionals struggled to
remain afloat in a sea of performance targets and in-
structions sent to them by the central administra-
tion. Morale in the NHS slumped. Increasing cen-
tralization meant the concentration of blame on the
government.
MORE MONEY AND MORE PLANS
With the NHS threatening to become an electoral
liability for the Labour Party, the government aban-
doned its commitment to fiscal restraint. On Janu-
ary 16, 2000, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced
a large increase in resources for the NHS, in effect
conceding that the service had indeed been under-
funded. The aim was to raise the level of expendi-
tures for the NHS from 6.7 percent of the gross do-
mestic product to 8 percent — the average level in
the European Union — by 2006 (as compared with
14 percent in the United States). And the government
followed  up  Blair’s  announcement  by  issuing  “The
NHS Plan,”1 which explained how the extra money
was to be spent.
“The NHS Plan” set out an ambitious program of
expansion over the coming five years. It promised
7000 additional hospital beds, 7500 more special-
ists, 2000 more general practitioners, 20,000 more
nurses, and 6500 more therapists. The expectation was
that with these extra resources, all patients who want-
ed to see their general practitioners would have ap-
pointments within 48 hours; that the maximal waiting
times for a hospital appointment and for inpatient
treatment would be cut to three and six months, re-
spectively; that hospital wards would be cleaner and
hospital food improved; and that there would be an
expansion of various screening programs. These are
only some of the promised improvements, but they
illustrate the extent and nature of the acknowledged
shortcomings of the NHS.
According to “The NHS Plan,” the modernized
NHS is to be centered on patients. There will be new
performance incentives for health care professionals
and greater flexibility in their roles. Patients will be
“empowered” by being given more information. Fur-
thermore, a patients’ forum is to be set up in every
primary care trust to articulate views about how local
services should be run. Lastly, to underline the New
Labour Party’s radicalism, there will be more coop-
eration with, and use of, the private sector — an ap-
proach that the Labour Party had previously never
been willing to contemplate.
FUTURE PROSPECTS
The strategy of the Labour government represents
a gamble. First, it represents a race against time. Will
it be possible to recruit and train the additional staff
on schedule? Can the culture of an organization as
complex and as rooted in tradition as the NHS be
transformed  within  five  years?  Second,  everything
hinges on the continued prosperity of the British
economy. The history of the NHS is littered with
plans for increased spending that had to be aban-
doned because of economic squalls. Third, will there
be sufficient visible improvements in performance to
satisfy public expectations? Fourth, the government’s
calculation is that the British people want faster ac-
cess to improved facilities rather than the freedom to
choose providers. Thus, the primary care trusts will
remain geographic monopolists with, in effect, a cap-
tive population. Individual practices within the trusts
also tend to be geographic monopolists, so that in
fact,  patients  often  cannot  exercise  their  right  to
choose a general practitioner. Can the service be made
more responsive to patients’ demands by strengthen-
ing  the  voice  of  patients  rather  than by providing
them with opportunities to seek care elsewhere?
The last and perhaps most important question is
whether the government can enlist the medical pro-
fession in its efforts to reform the NHS. Neither the
promise of extra resources nor the other measures
have halted the decline in the profession’s morale.
On the contrary, discontent has continued to mount
among both general practitioners11 and specialists.12
In part, this reflects international trends and is not
specific  to  Britain.  Apprehension  about  threats  to
medical autonomy and about changing patterns of
practice is widespread. Witness the backlash against
managed care in the United States and the recent
doctors’ strikes in Canada and the Netherlands. But
plummeting morale among British physicians also re-
flects the fact that national policies are imposing extra
demands on them, and the prospect of relief from
this pressure is only a promissory note. Without the
active engagement of the medical profession, the gov-
ernment is unlikely to achieve its goals.
If the gamble does not pay off, the prospect is that
the present set of reforms will not be the last. In the
general election of June 2001, which once again re-
sulted in a large Labour majority, the government
made improvements in public services such as the
NHS a central part of its program. And although
“The NHS Plan” makes a rhetorical commitment to
decentralization, the national government may be-
come increasingly zealous and intrusive in its efforts
to satisfy the public expectations that it has stoked
up — and in doing so, the government may para-
doxically underline its responsibility for any failings.
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at LONDON SCH HYGIENE & TROPICAL MED on February 19, 2014. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2001 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 308 · N Engl J Med, Vol. 345, No. 4 · July 26, 2001 · www.nejm.org
The New England Journal of Medicine
If so, the political costs of maintaining the NHS in
its present form will escalate.
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